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Based on the contracting theory, the agency theory and combined with ultimate 
owner and managerial power theory, this dissertation researches on monetary rewards 
incentive in state-owned listed companies. Compensation incentive is considered as 
one of ways to solve principal-agent problem, but the peculiarity of agent chain of 
state-owned companies in our country----there are both economic agent relationship 
and administration agent relationship, result in the differences in compensation 
incentive between state-owned listed companies and companies with other ownership 
nature. Recent studies on managerial power show that managerial power may be a 
part of agent problem in the determination and execution of the compensation. For 
this reason, the dissertation aims to research on the determinants on monetary rewards 
incentive in state-owned listed companies and investigates the influence of ultimate 
owner and managerial power. By these, I hope the dissertation can provide some 
empirical evidences for the development and improvement of incentive mechanism of 
state-owned companies in our country. 
The study divides operators of state-owned companies into four crossed 
hierarchies (management authorities, chairman of the board, board members, 
management authorities and board members), and tests the determinants of the change 
of compensation and the fixed compensation. Based on the empirical results, the 
conclusions of the dissertation are: 
Firstly, in state-owned listed companies in our country, the sensitivity between 
operators’ monetary rewards incentives and performance of the listed companies is 
not high. Especially for broad members, management authorities and board members, 
there are strong rigidity in monetary rewards incentives and this can’t stimulate the 
operators of state-owned listed companies to improve the performance of the listed 
companies. The effects of monetary rewards incentives are not ideal. 
Secondly, the different natures of ultimate owners result in the differences of 
operators’ monetary rewards incentives, but local controlled listed companies don’t 
provide more efficient monetary rewards incentives for operators. 
Thirdly, managerial power exercises influence on operators’ monetary rewards 
incentives, but there are differences between the impaction of managerial power in the 
determination of operators’ monetary rewards incentives in listed companies in our 













In the state-owned listed companies in our country, because of the absence of the 
administration agent relationship, operators especially the chairmen of the broad pay 
more attention to implicit incentives----promotion, and their dependent degree on 
monetary rewards incentives is slow. Consequently, the enlargement and enhancement 
of managerial power don’t necessarily result in the increase of monetary rewards. 
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根据企业所有权结构和相应的控制机制理论的 新发展，La Porta 等（1999）
















































































1.3   论文结构安排 
基于上述思路，本文共分为八章，现将后续章节内容列示如下： 
第二章   文献回顾与理论分析，在检索文献的基础上，对于本文研究的主
要问题——终极产权及管理当局权力对国有上市公司经营者货币薪酬激励的影
响进行简要的文献综述。 








第五章   终控制人性质、管理当局权力对国有上市公司董事长货币薪酬
影响的实证分析结果，按照第三章的研究设计，本部分内容将就 终控制人与管
理当局权力对国有上市公司董事长货币薪酬所造成的影响进行分析。 
第六章   终控制人性质、管理当局权力对国有上市公司董事会成员货币
薪酬影响的实证分析结果，本章将对 终控制人性质、管理当局权力对国有上市
公司董事会成员的货币薪酬所造成的影响进行分析。 
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